This study examined differences between paid and unpaid family/friend caregivers to better understand the consumer-driven caregiving workforce. We compared economic vulnerability, unhealthy behavior, and serious emotional distress for 475 paid and 10,500 unpaid family/friend informal caregivers from the 2009 California Health Interview Survey. We then estimated whether caregiver status moderated the relationship between economic vulnerability and health outcomes. Compared to unpaid family/friend caregivers, paid family/friend caregivers had a 27% greater risk (p ¼ .002) of economic vulnerability. Among all family/friend caregivers, the probabilities of serious emotional distress and unhealthy behaviors increased by >100% and 28% for
those with the greatest compared to the least economic vulnerability, and caregiver type did not moderate these relationships. To address economic and health vulnerabilities of paid informal caregivers, policy makers might increase wages in consumer-driven programs. These changes could prove beneficial to both paid informal caregivers and their care recipients, while reducing longterm inefficiencies in consumer-driven programs.
Keywords caregiving formal, Medicaid, health behavior, distress, consumer-driven programs Consumer-driven caregiving programs are designed to benefit both caregivers and care recipients. To address the growing support needs of the U.S. older adult population, states have increasingly adopted caregiving programs that pay untrained informal caregivers to provide care (Foster, Dale, & Brown, 2007) . The programs are "consumer driven" because they allow for substantial beneficiary direction-Medicaid beneficiaries can hire, train, and fire their care provider who can be a family member or friend (Kaye, 2014) . A number of states have recently adopted these programs through Medicaid waivers; California's In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program is the nation's largest consumer-driven program.
However, the implications of increased use of consumer-driven programs are uncertain. There are reasons to believe the programs may benefit both caregiver and care recipient-because a care recipient can retain the services of an informal caregiver they know and trust, while the Medicaid reimbursement may allow a caregiver to avoid the economic losses associated with caregiving (Butrica & Karamcheva, 2014) . Caregivers may also financially and emotionally benefit, due to the Medicaid reimbursement and because they are able to help a loved one (Benjamin & Matthias, 2004; Foster et al., 2007; Simon-Rusinowitz et al., 2014) . Further, reimbursement could increase resources for self-care such as physical exercise or other health behaviors.
On the other hand, there may be drawbacks to the expansion of such programs. The Medicaid programs may not help caregivers financially because reimbursement rates are low (Hoffman & Wallace, 2012 ; Legislative Analyst's Office [LAO], 2009 ). Wages in consumer-directed programs are similar to those of home health agency caregivers, many of whom live in poverty and rely on public benefits (Direct Care Alliance [DCA] , 2012. Also, caregivers may give up other paid employment when they sign up, resulting in reduced overall income. More than half of the informal caregivers work full-time, while 10% work part-time (Hoffman & Mendez-Luck, 2011) . However, individuals who become consumer-directed caregivers may have limited earning potential, as the number of weekly care hours for the majority of care recipients in IHSS is 20 hours or less (LAO, 2009) .
The implications of consumer-driven care are important for the future of the program. First, the economic and health circumstances of paid informal caregivers affects the attraction and retention of workers, as unpaid informal caregivers represent the largest source of potential labor for consumerdriven care (Benjamin, Matthias, Kietzman, & Furman, 2008) . If wages or benefits are too low, or if providers are dissatisfied with these programs, they are unlikely to continue as caregivers. A depleted workforce could tamp continuing efforts to expand consumer-driven programs. Second, financial issues or poorer health of paid caregivers could negatively impact quality of care, dampening the efficiency and effectiveness of the Medicaid programs.
Despite the importance for policy makers of empirical information about paid informal caregivers, such information is limited. Existing literature has compared paid informal caregivers to other paid caregivers, that is, professional home care agency workers (Benjamin & Matthias, 2004; Foster et al., 2007; Simon-Rusinowitz et al., 2010) . But, unpaid informal caregivers are more like paid informal caregivers-similar socioeconomic backgrounds, often untrained and caring for family members-and thus provide a more natural comparison group for examining the well-being of consumer-driven caregivers. However, to our knowledge, no existing research directly compares the characteristics of these two groups.
To address this gap in the literature regarding, we examined the relative economic and health characteristics of paid versus unpaid informal caregivers in California, which has the nation's largest consumer-driven caregiving program. In this observational study, we had three aims: (1) to compare the economic characteristics, emotional distress, and health behaviors of paid compared to unpaid informal caregivers; (2) to assess whether informal caregiver health worsens with increased economic vulnerability; and (3) to determine whether worsening of health with increased vulnerability varies by paid versus unpaid caregiver status.
Background
California's IHSS program. IHSS provides paid caregiving to over 450,000 aged, blind, and persons with disabilities (Taylor, 2015) . While the majority of IHSS recipients are adults ages 65 and older, children and younger adult Medicaid (called Medi-Cal in California) beneficiaries are eligible for the program as long as they live in their own home (HHS, 2008) . Parents of lowincome children with disabilities may be paid IHSS providers under certain circumstances (such as when a parent quits a full-time job to care for the child) and spouses may also provide paid help under IHSS as long as the couple meets income requirements and has resources (aside from their home and one vehicle) valued at US$3,000 or less (HHS, 2008) . IHSS and similar state programs may offer benefits that address long-standing concerns about the well-being of the informal caregiving workforce (Institute of Medicine [IOM], 2016; National Alliance for Caregiving, 2015).
Informal caregiving in the United States. More than 44 million Americans receive help from informal caregivers-family and friends who offer help to those with long-term physical conditions; of those, an estimated 5.2 million caregivers assisted an ill or disabled spouse (National Alliance for Caregiving, 2015) . Over half of the informal caregivers are aged 50 and older while one in five are aged 75 and older; the average informal caregiver is female (*60%), non-Hispanic White (*70%), has less than a bachelor's degree level of education (*75%), and cares for a relative (85%) (IOM, 2016; National Alliance for Caregiving, 2015) . Caregiving needs may vary by race, due to greater functional limitations for older minority racial/ethnic groups (IOM, 2016) . Although two in the three caregivers report part-time or full-time employment status, nearly one in three report incomes at less than 2 times the Federal Poverty Level (FPL; Hoffman & Mendez-Luck, 2011) .
Health and economic effects of informal caregiving. Prior research has observed negative associations between caregiving and various health measures. Informal caregiving can result in negative emotional health effects for caregivers (Benjamin, Matthias, & Franke, 2000; Garand, Dew, Eazor, DeKosky, & Reynolds, 2005) , unhealthy behaviors (Hoffman, Lee, & Mendez-Luck, 2012; Mendez-Luck, Walker, & Luck, 2016) , and negative longer term physical health outcomes (Capistrant, Berkman, & Glymour, 2014) .
Beyond health, caring for others has negative financial implications. Many informal caregivers experience financial pressures when balancing work and unpaid caregiving responsibilities (IOM, 2016; National Alliance for Caregiving, 2015) . Providing care is time consuming, reducing opportunities for full-time employment; it also may increase spending, if care recipients need help to pay for medical equipment, medicine, or medical care. Because of this, informal care responsibilities can result in lost wages and benefits as well as out-of-pocket costs involving care recipients' care needs (Hoffman & Mendez-Luck, 2011; Reinhard, Feinberg, Choula, & Houseer, 2015) .
Consumer-driven paid caregiving may be beneficial for caregivers as well as care recipients. Studies suggest that consumer-driven caregivers are as satisfied, if not more satisfied in their caregiving role (and generally had lower emotional strain and limitations to their personal social lives), than agency-based workers (Benjamin & Matthias, 2004; Simon-Rusinowitz et al., 2014) . Also payment for informal caregiving may translate to reduced emotional distress associated with lost wages and employment opportunity (Benjamin & Matthias, 2004; Foster et al., 2007; Simon-Rusinowitz et al., 2014) . Care recipients also tend to more highly rate their safety and overall satisfcation with care quality when they receive care from consumer-driven rather than agency-based caregivers (Benjamin et al., 2000) .
However, as opposed to agency-based caregivers, other nonprofessional informal caregivers provide a more apt comparison group for this analysis. Professional, agency-based caregivers differ considerably from unpaid informal caregivers in terms of pay and training (DCA, 2012) . Agency-based caregivers, professionally trained and often low-income and poorly educated, may not be an ideal comparison group for understanding consumer-driven paid caregivers. Therefore, a better understanding of the characteristics of both groups of informal caregivers may inform policy makers as to the benefits and areas for improvement with paid informal care.
Method Data
We used the 2009 California Health Interview Survey (CHIS), the nation's largest statewide health survey. The CHIS employs telephone interviews, employing a multistage sampling design using a random digit dial sample of landline and cellular telephone numbers to randomly select households. In order to generalize results to the state's noninstitutionalized population, we employed survey weights. We examined 2009 survey data because caregiving was only examined in the 2009 CHIS.
Study Population
We examined two groups of informal caregivers caring for family members or friends. We first identified all caregivers ages 18 and over in our sample (n ¼ 11,321), individuals who responded yes to the question, "Some people provide help to a family member or friend who has a long-term illness or disability. This may include help with things they can no longer do for themselves. During the past 12 months, did you provide any such help to a family member or friend?" Next, we distinguished paid (n ¼ 821) from unpaid (n ¼ 10,500) caregivers, with paid caregivers identified as those who responded affirmatively to the question, "Did you get paid for any of the time you spent helping your [family member/friend]?" Subsequently, we identified, among the group of 821 paid caregivers, those who reported having provided care to a Medi-Cal beneficiary (n ¼ 502) and excluded 77 individuals who provided care to individuals in nursing homes (as IHSS does not allow care for individuals in nursing homes; Disability Rights California [DRC], 2008) , resulting in a sample of 475 paid Medi-Cal caregivers (hereafter abbreviated as PMCs). Our comparison group included individuals who reported being caregivers and who said they were not paid for the care they provided. This resulted in a sample of 10,500 unpaid caregivers (hereafter abbreviated as UCs). See Figure S1 (Supplemental Online Material) for sample derivation.
Measures
Outcome measures. We assessed measures of economic status and health. First, we measured a set of factors associated with a caregiver's economic status. Income does not fully capture economic status (Economic Security Index [ESI], 2012).Therefore, we created an index that reflects both income and additional economic status indicators: (1) poverty (i.e., <100% of the FPL), (2) food insecurity (only measured for those with incomes <200% FPL), (3) lack of home ownership (i.e., renting, as opposed to home ownership), (4) lack of health insurance coverage, (5) lack of a usual source of medical care, (6) delays in getting medical care, and (7) delays in getting prescription medications. We obtained a summary index score by adding the total number of points across the seven indicators, with one point assigned for an affirmative status for each of the seven indicator variables. Because some score categories contained small cell sizes, we then created a dichotomous indicator for whether individuals were economically vulnerable based upon an extreme score in the 90th percentile (which averaged to a score of 3 of a possible total score of 7). We tested our results with a lower vulnerability score threshold (e.g., 75th percentile, which averaged a score of 2) and obtained similar results (not reported). In sensitivity analyses, we also reran all analyses using a continuous score of economic vulnerability, although some estimates are unstable or missing due to limited sample size; results are reported below. Finally, we created a categorical variable indicating economic vulnerability levels: score of 0-1, 2-3, and 4-7, with 0-1, as the reference category that is used in some analyses as a predictor variable.
Next, we created two measures representing caregiver health. First, we assessed emotional health (Schulz & Sherwood, 2008) using the Kessler K6 (range of 0-24), a short screening scale used to monitor the prevalence of psychological distress in a general population (Kessler et al., 2002) . We created a dichotomous indicator for whether individuals were seriously emotionally distressed (score >12 on the K6; Hoffman & Mendez-Luck, 2011) . Second, we used a previously developed dichotomous indicator of overall unhealthy behavior , which comprised four health behaviors: (1) current smoker, (2) ate fast food more than once per week, (3) drank soda more than 3.5 times per week, and (4) demonstrated sedentary physical behavior. We identified individuals as having overall unhealthy behavior if they had 2 of these four unhealthy behaviors.
Predictor variables. We compared economic and health characteristics of two groups of informal caregivers. To account for factors that could confound the observed relationships between the two outcomes and the informal caregiver groups, we adjusted for socioeconomic and health characteristics. The socioeconomic factors we controlled for were age (18, continuous), gender, race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic White, African-American, Hispanic, Asian/ Pacific Islander, and other), and educational level (less than high school, high school, some college, college, and master of arts /master of science / doctor of philosophy). Functional limitations and therefore caregiving demand among older adults vary considerably by age as well as racial/ethnic status (IOM, 2016) . We also considered race/ethnicity and educational level as proxies for cultural caregiving-related preferences, which impact decisions regarding family caregiving support (Dilworth-Anderson, Williams, & Gibson, 2002) and because demand for caregiving varies by socioeconomic status (IOM, 2016) . Because the presence of a spouse as well as an individual's geographic location and neighborhood environment affect the availability of informal care and demand for services (IOM, 2016; Pinquart & Sorenson, 2011) , we also controlled for marital status and geographic location, which we measured as residency in an (1) urban, (2) smaller city/ suburban area, and (3) town/rural area (CHPR, 2008) . Given that the decision to provide care may be affected by health status (Do, Norton, Stearns, & Van Houtven, 2015) , we additionally controlled for a set of caregiver health characteristic indicators: self-rated health status, history of heart disease, high blood pressure, asthma, and diabetes, whether a health condition limits basic physical activities, and body mass index.
Analysis. We first provided survey-weighted unadjusted descriptive statistics and used t tests and w 2 tests to identify statistically significant differences (at p < .05) between informal caregiver populations. Next, we specified logistic regression models to assess the relationships between our three dichotomous outcome variables (economic vulnerability, serious emotional distress, and unhealthy behavior) and our indicator of informal caregiver status (Aim 1). For ease of interpretation, we computed predicted and marginal probabilities. Predicted probabilities are the sample average of the prediction of the outcome of interest when the regressor of interest is reset to a particular value while all other model covariates are kept at their observed values (Stata, 2013) . The marginal risk is the difference in the predicted risk across the categories of the regressor of interest (e.g., across the PMC and UC categories). Next, we tested whether economic vulnerability was associated with the two health outcomes for all informal caregivers (both PMCs and UCs) and the two health outcomes, serious emotional distress and unhealthy behavior (Aim 2). To do so, we separately regressed each of the two health outcomes on the economic vulnerability score. Finally, we tested whether caregiver status (PMC/UC) moderated the relationship between economic vulnerability and the two health outcomes (Aim 3). To do so, we estimated two models which each included an interaction term between the vulnerability score and the informal caregiver category (PMC/UC). All models were specified with survey weights using the Jackknife method with 80 replications to account for the survey's complex sampling design.
Results

Unadjusted Results: Paid Medi-Cal Family/Friend Caregivers (PMCs) and Unpaid Family/Friend Caregivers (UCs)
Compared to nearly three quarters of PMCs, just over half of the UCs were women (Table 1) . Only one third of the PMCs were non-Hispanic White compared to over half of the UCs. PMCs also had lower levels of education, were more often single or divorced, and were in poorer health compared to UCs. Compared to UCs, PMCs also more often reported living in poverty, being food insecure (28% vs. 15%), renting rather than owning a home (46% vs. 32%), and having overall economic vulnerability (56% vs. 37%). PMCs provided nearly twice the number of weekly care hours as UCs-44 hr (SD: 4) versus 20 (SD: 1) as well as total months of care that was provided to the care recipient-72 (SD: 6) versus 36 (SD: 1; see Table S1 in Supplemental Online Material). Compared to UCs, more PMCs reported spending their own money on (59% vs. 46%) and living with their care recipient (62% vs. 33%).
Adjusted Results
Economic outcomes, serious emotional distress, and health behaviors. After adjustment for caregivers' sociodemographic and health characteristics, PMCs had a 45% probability of economic vulnerability compared to a 36% probability for UCs (Figure 1) . This amounted to a 27% higher (p ¼ .002) adjusted probability of vulnerability among PMC versus UCs. When measured as a continuous score, predicted economic vulnerability was not significantly different between UCs (1.3) and PMCs (1.5) (p ¼ .08; Figure S2 ).
PMCs and UCs each had an adjusted 9% probability of serious distressno relative difference (p ¼ .91; Figure 1 ). There were no significant differences in unhealthy behaviors across the two family/friend caregiver groups (25% for PMCs and 20% for UCs, p ¼ .21). Economic vulnerability and health outcomes across all family/friend caregivers. Across all caregivers (PMCs and UCs), the probability of serious emotional distress increased at higher economic vulnerability levels. The predicted probability of distress for those with 4-7 vulnerability scores (15.2%) was more than double that of those with 0-1 vulnerability score (7.1%). Similarly, the predicted probability of unhealthy behaviors was nearly 50% greater for those with a 4-7 score (27.8%) compared to those with a 0-1 (18.4%) score (see Figure 2) . Results were similar when economic vulnerability was measured as a continuous rather than dichotomous variable. For each increased unit of vulnerability, the marginal percentage point increases in distress and unhealthy behavior were 2.0 (p < .001) and 2.2 (p ¼ .001), respectively ( Figure S3 ).
Economic vulnerability and health outcomes by family/friend caregiver status. Findings suggest that informal caregiver payment did not moderate the relationship between economic vulnerability and either of emotional distress or overall unhealthy behavior ( Figure 3 and Table S2 in Supplemental Online Material). As shown in Table S2 and Figure S4 , when measured continuously, economic vulnerability was significantly associated with emotional distress for UCs but not PMCs. However, interaction terms (interactions between economic vulnerability category and caregiver type) were not statistically significant in models assessing likelihoods of emotional distress or unhealthy behavior. Generally, we interpret these findings with caution given the large confidence intervals around the point estimates for the PMCs.
Discussion
Our study showed that, while providing support to a group of physically vulnerable Medi-Cal beneficiaries, paid informal caregivers experienced economic vulnerability. Over half of the paid informal caregivers of MediCal beneficiaries had economic vulnerability and the likelihood of economic vulnerability was 27% greater among paid informal caregivers compared to unpaid informal caregivers. Such vulnerability reflected insecurity on a broad set of economic measures including food insecurity, home ownership, health insurance coverage, and difficulties accessing medical care and filling prescriptions. Nearly, one in four paid informal caregivers had two or more unhealthy behaviors, while at greater levels of economic vulnerability, paid informal caregivers experienced increased risk of unhealthy behaviors. The observed economic vulnerability and unhealthy behaviors have implications for paid informal caregivers' future health. Economically vulnerable individuals may experience a cascade of unhealthy due to a confluence of economic and caregiving stressors. Limited resources for self-care (Catalano et al., 2011) may put economically vulnerable caregivers at heightened risk for chronic stress (Pearlin, 2010) , which can result in future detriment to emotional and physical health (Aina & Susman, 2006) . Moreover, vulnerable paid informal caregivers will experience the burdens of informal caregiving (Schulz & Sherwood, 2008) .
Paid informal caregivers' potential negative health outcomes may also compromise consumer-driven programs. The Medicaid program's reliance on financially strapped and low-income caregivers may result in quality of care issues-if caregivers' economic and health issues affect the care that they provide (Hoffman & Wallace, 2012) . At the same time, a reliance on low-income providers could have downstream consequences for consumerdriven care. Current paid informal caregivers not only represent a primary source of labor for consumer-driven programs (Benjamin et al., 2008) but may become Medi-Cal beneficiaries who themselves will require consumer-driven care in the future. In our sample, we observed that 10% of both informal caregiver groups reported having serious emotional distress, while 20% of paid informal caregivers indicated that they were themselves Medi-Cal beneficiaries. Therefore, today's consumer-driven caregivers represent both current and potential future users of Medi-Cal dollars.
Policy makers have several options to address the economic vulnerability of Medi-Cal's paid informal caregivers. First, wage increases for paid informal caregivers may prove beneficial. Presently, California's consumerdriven caregivers do not receive pay for all of the hours of care they provide (Benjamin & Matthias, 2004) , given limitations on the total allowable monthly service hours for paid informal caregivers (LAO, 2009) . Because of this, nominal hourly wages may not reflect wages received across total actual hours worked. In response to wage pressures, several county-based IHSS programs have increased their contributions to IHSS wages. Recently, California passed legislation that will gradually raise wages over time for its IHSS workers (Barzar & Gorn, 2016) . Other states might follow suit. Beyond wage increases, policy makers might also expand monthly service hour thresholds for paid caregivers working with beneficiaries who have the most time-consuming care needs.
Together, these wage-related changes may reduce economic insecurity and, further, reduce turnover in the consumer-driven caregiver workforce. A prior study observed a 57% decline in the job turnover rate among home care workers after implementation of a living wage in San Francisco and, for each US$1 increase in the hourly wage rate, there was a 12-percentage point increase in the probability of staying in the workforce for more than 1 year (Howes, 2004) . Thus, a wage increase could reduce the high program turnover among consumer-driven caregivers that has been previously observed (Benjamin et al., 2008; Hoffman & Wallace, 2012) . Moreover, a reduction in job turnover may positively impact emotional health among consumerdriven caregivers (Catalano et al., 2011) . Also, given that newer caregivers have less training and familiarity with their care recipients, reduced turnover among caregivers might improve the efficiency and quality of care provided in consumer-driven programs.
Finally, our findings suggest that policy makers might leverage consumer-driven programs to further bolster the health of care recipients and paid informal caregivers. Innovative consumer-driven programs address the economic vulnerability of informal caregivers (California Association of Public Authorities, 2012), but policy changes might improve downstream health outcomes for both members of the program's caregiving-care recipient dyads. Medicaid might invest in paid informal caregivers both directly-through higher wages and more paid service hours-and indirectly-through improved case management, links to community social supports and services, and preventive care for care recipients with longterm care needs. These care recipient supports might relieve some of the caregiving burden for consumer-directed providers. Such an approach would also align with the growing emphasis on family-centered care, in which care delivery takes into account family relationships, joint decisionmaking, and care preferences of both patients and their family (IOM, 2016; Mendez-Luck, Amorim, & Anthony, 2016) .
Limitations
The study had several limitations. First, our consideration of paid Medi-Cal caregivers as representative of California's IHSS caregivers may have involved some misclassification. Unlike our paid Medi-Cal caregivers sample which includes just family member and friend caregivers, IHSS caregivers additionally include individuals who are not family members or friends. However, data on IHSS caregivers indicate a high degree of similarity between the total number of family and friend caregivers in IHSS and paid Medi-Cal caregivers in our sample. When extrapolated to the total California population in 2009, our sample's 475 paid Medi-Cal caregivers represent statewide an estimated *260,000 paid Medi-Cal caregivers-a nearly identical amount when compared to the estimated number of family and friend IHSS caregivers. Approximately 70% of 450,000, or 317,000, IHSS care recipients received care from a family member or friend in 2014, and on average, each of those family or friend caregivers provided care to *1.2 care recipients-totaling *260,000 unique family or friend consumer-driven caregivers (LAO, 2014) . Second, given that opportunity costs of time can influence individuals' decisions regarding caregiving and that socioeconomic and health factors may correlate with opportunity costs (Do et al., 2015) , our study may have selection bias. Although our multivariable models controlled for socioeconomic and health characteristics, we cannot conclude from our study that paid informal caregiving causes financial harm. Even accounting for clear differences in socioeconomic and health factors, however, paid informal Medi-Cal caregivers have greater risk of economic vulnerability than unpaid informal caregivers. Finally, our economic vulnerability measure may overweight health care problems given Items #4-7 (see Method above), which will most acutely affect individuals with the poorest health.
Conclusion
Even as federal policies increasingly incentivize community-based as opposed to institutional care, California's sociodemographically diverse caregivers for Medi-Cal beneficiaries experience greater risk of economic vulnerability compared to other informal caregivers. While caring for the most vulnerable Medi-Cal recipients, these paid caregivers themselves exhibit vulnerability in their finances and health, with the most vulnerable among them at substantially greater risk of unhealthy behaviors. While consumerdriven programs appear to provide an innovative and useful framework for delivery of long-term services and supports, policy makers may wish to address the vulnerability of its paid caregiver workforce. Changes to provider compensation or service hour thresholds may in the long-term benefit the program's cost-effectiveness while strengthening the program's focus on both economic and health needs of caregiver-care recipient units-particularly among family caregiver-care recipient dyads who have the greatest economic and health risks.
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